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Economic Evidence in Regulatory
Disputes: Revisiting the Court–Regulatory
Agency Relationship in the US and
the UK
Despoina Mantzari*
Abstract—This article examines the issue of the appropriate scope of review of
economic evidence enshrined in the discretionary assessments of utility regulators
in the US and the UK. It advances a balance of institutional competencies
approach to the question of the degree of deference owed to the regulatory agency’s
economic assessments. In doing so, it revisits the doctrinal positions advanced in
the US and the UK for the substantive review of administrative discretion, so as to
become attuned to the challenges posed by economic evidence. Drawing on
insights from political science and economics, the suggested approach illuminates
the institutional disadvantages of the courts that may warrant a high degree of
deference. At the same time, however, it remains sensitive to the polycentric
elements of regulatory disputes as well as to a number of institutional realities that
may attenuate the weight of such comparative institutional disadvantages.
Keywords: judicial review, adjudication, economic regulation, evidence, compara-
tive law, administrative law
1. Introduction
The prominent role acquired by expert economic evidence and analysis1 in the
regulatory and adjudicative process of utility regulation (ie energy, telecoms,
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as well as participants at the UC Berkeley Centre for the Study of Law and Society at the ESRC Centre for
Competition Policy Seminar Series, UEA and at the Centre for Commercial Law and Financial Regulation
Research Seminar Series at the University of Reading, for helpful comments and discussions on earlier versions of
this paper. Any views expressed, omissions or mistakes are mine. The support of the Arts and Humanities
Research Council is gratefully acknowledged.
1 Economic evidence and analysis, as understood in this article, derives from the field of industrial
organisation and informs regulatory decisions concerning, amongst others, access to networks and price
regulation. Economic analysis employed to understand and measure the costs and benefits of different policy
options (ie cost–benefit analysis) is outside the scope of this article. See further DW Carlton and JM Perloff,
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water) has renewed policy interest in regulatory appeals.2 From Australia to the
UK, several jurisdictions have been focusing their attention on the review
mechanisms of regulatory decisions in the utilities sector, as evidenced by a
number of high-profile policy reforms.3 One of the central themes of this
emerging academic and policy debate on regulatory appeals concerns the
appropriate scope of review of economic evidence enshrined in the regulators’
decisions. Couched in the familiar language of ‘judicial deference’ versus ‘non-
deference’, the scope of review encompasses questions concerning the standard
of review (eg correctness, reasonableness) and the intensity thereof. Naturally,
such questions arise both in the context of judicial control of agency statutory
interpretation and that of agency fact finding and policy making.4 The focus of
this article, however, is on the latter theme only. Assuming that appeals serve
as a mechanism for ensuring the soundness and accuracy of regulatory
decisions, does and should economic evidence change the scope and intensity
of review? This article represents the first attempt to address these questions.
In doing so, it engages in a comparative analysis of the court–regulatory agency
relationship in the realm of policy in two common law jurisdictions: the US (on
the federal level) and the UK.5 As will be shown in Section 3, significant
institutional differences exist between the US and the UK with regard to the
procedures available for the review of economic evidence. Hence, the choice of
these comparator jurisdictions permits the observation of how economic
evidence is reviewed in different institutional settings and the role of the
different standards of review for the judicial scrutiny of economic evidence.
That said, the articles focuses on the substantive review of economic evidence
enshrined in the discretionary assessments of the federal regulators of energy
(Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, FERC)6 and communications
(Federal Communications Commission, FCC)7 in the US8 and the sectoral
Modern Industrial Organization (4th edn, Addison-Wesley 2004); C Decker, Modern Economic Regulation: An
Introduction to Theory and Practice (CUP 2014).
2 The term ‘regulatory appeals’ is used broadly to encompass both the supervisory character of review
(judicial review) and the appellate one (merits review). See further Section 3.
3 In Australia see Standing Council on Energy and Resources, ‘Review of the Limited Merits Review Regime’
(July 2012) <www.scer.gov.au/workstreams/energy-market-reform/limited-merits-review/lmr-review/> accessed
17 September 2015. In the UK, see Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, ‘Streamlining Regulatory
and Competition Appeals-Consultation on Options for Reform’ (June 2013) 82–7 <www.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/229758/bis-13-876-regulatory-and-competition-appeals-revised.
pdf> accessed 17 September 2015.
4 Assume that there exist reasonably clear and objective criteria for separating questions of law from questions
of fact and policy.
5 The UK refers to the England and Wales jurisdiction unless otherwise stated.
6 The FERC is an agency within the Department of Energy and has assumed responsibilities and powers
previously held by the Federal Power Commission. It is charged with implementing and enforcing the Federal
Power Act 1935, the Natural Gas Act 1938, the Natural Gas Policy Act 1978 and various other pieces of federal
energy legislation.
7 The FCC was established by the Communications Act of 1934 and is responsible for regulating interstate
and international communications by radio, TV, wire, satellite and cable across the US.
8 The US lacks a federal regulator for water.
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regulators of communications (Office of Communications, OFCOM),9 energy
(Office of Gas and Electricity Markets, OFGEM)10 and water (Office of Water
Services, OFWAT)11 in the UK. Such assessments are typically challenged by
the ‘arbitrary, capricious or abuse of discretion’12 ground of review of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA)13 of 1946 in the US and by the
Wednesbury14 unreasonableness, or what has now become the irrationality
ground of review in the UK.15
The article suggests that courts, when reviewing the regulators’ economic
assessments, should embrace comparative institutional competencies consider-
ations alongside constitutional, institutional and historical considerations that
have informed the scope and intensity of substantive review of the regulatory
agency’s discretion. It thus advocates that a balance of comparative institu-
tional competencies approach to deference may provide a better understanding
of the proper contours of judicial deference to the regulators’ economic
assessments. This approach—which draws significantly on Neil Komesar’s
analytical framework of comparative institutional analysis16—envisions that,
when faced with the regulatory agencies’ discretionary economic assessments,
courts should weight their relative institutional advantages and disadvantages in
resolving such issues against that of the regulators before deciding on the
appropriate amount of deference to accord to the agency’s economic
assessments.17 Komesar approaches institutions, such as the adjudicative and
regulatory process, as imperfect alternative mechanisms by which societies
carry out their goals. Because one institution may be better able to implement
those goals than another institution, comparative institutional analysis stresses
the primary role of institutional choice: ‘the decision of who decides’.18
Komesar approaches these choices in ‘participatory terms’ (the direct or
indirect participation in the decision making of the affected stakeholders).
Which institution brings out the diversity of affected interests on a given issue,
while avoiding situations of both ‘minoritarian bias’ (the over-representation of
9 But only with respect to the regulation of telecommunications. OFCOM was established by the
Communications Act 2002 and operates under a number of Acts of Parliament and other statutes. It is
responsible for regulating the TV and radio sectors, fixed-line telecoms, mobiles, postal services and the airwaves
over which wireless devices operate.
10 OFGEM was set up by the Utilities Act in 2000. It is charged with implementing the Gas Act 1986, the
Electricity Act 1989, the Utilities Act 2000, the Competition Act 1998, the Enterprise Act 2002, the Energy Acts
of 2004, 2008, 2010 and 2011 and the relevant EU legislation, as well as the administration of a number of
environmental projects on behalf of the Department of Energy and Climate Change.
11 OFWAT was established by the Water Act 2003 and is responsible for the regulation of the water and
sewerage industries in England and Wales.
12 APA, 5 USC § 706(2) (A).
13 See APA. Pub L No 79-404, Ch 324, 60 Stat 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5
USC).
14 Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223.
15 CCSU v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374 (HL).
16 NK Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics and Public Policy (University of
Chicago Press 1997) 26.
17 ibid 3–13.
18 ibid 3.
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minority interests seeking rents) and ‘majoritarian bias’ (the over-representa-
tion of majority interests, such as consumers)?19
Significant scholarly attention has focused on the relative institutional
advantages and disadvantages of courts in assessing different types of evidence
(ie scientific, economic, forensic) and in various areas of law (ie securities
regulation, competition law).20 This article seeks to contribute to this body of
literature by contextualising some of the institutional competencies claims in
the so far unexplored area of economic evidence in regulatory disputes. That
said, it does not attempt to provide a ‘golden rule’ concerning the appropriate
degree of deference to the regulators’ economic assessments. The ambition is
much narrower and is critical: it is to stress that any determination of the
appropriate scope of review of economic evidence should avoid single-factor
considerations (eg that judges do not possess expertise in economics) in favour
of a richer set of institutional factors. A comparative institutional analysis
approach to deference, as undertaken in this article, serves to illuminate these
factors.
The article is structured as follows. Sections 2 and 3 present the context in
which the analysis of the suggested comparative institutional competencies
approach will be conducted. Section 2 discusses the relevance of economic
evidence in regulatory disputes and explores its implications for the review of
regulatory agencies’ decisions. Section 3 provides an overview of the different
avenues for challenging regulatory decisions in the US and the UK. Section 4
examines the doctrinal positions advanced in the US and the UK for the
substantive review of regulatory agency discretion and Section 5 advances the
balance of institutional competencies approach to deference. Finally, in Section
6, some concluding observations are offered on the implications of the
substantive analysis for the current debate on regulatory appeals in the UK.
2. Economic Evidence in Regulatory Disputes: Scope
and Implications
It would be impossible to investigate the relationship between the court and the
regulatory agency against the backdrop of economic evidence without first
venturing into the legal relevance and implications of economic evidence in
regulatory disputes. Doing so will help one to better appreciate the significance
of comparative institutional competencies considerations in determining the
degree of deference to the regulators’ economic assessments.
19 ibid 27.
20 See eg WN Eskridge, ‘Expanding Chevron’s Domain: A Comparative Institutional Analysis of the Relative
Competence of Courts and Agencies to Interpret Statutes’ (2013) 2013(2) Wisconsin L Rev 412; P Swire,
‘Finding the Best of the Imperfect Alternatives for Privacy, Health IT and Cybersecurity’ (2013) 2013(2)
Wisconsin L Rev 649; EL Rubin, ‘The Illusion of Property as a Right and its Reality as an Imperfect Alternative’
(2013) 2013(2) Wisconsin L Rev 573; I Lianos, ‘Some Reflections on the Question of Goals of EU Competition
Law’ in I Lianos and D Geradin (eds), Handbook on European Competition Law—Substantive Aspects (EE 2013) 1.
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A. The Legal Relevance and Challenges of Economic Evidence in
Regulatory Disputes
There are at least two ways in which economic evidence influences the
adjudication of regulatory disputes. The first one is direct and refers to the
presentation of economic evidence in the courtroom. Economists are routinely
called upon to testify as economic expert witnesses and prove specific
economic facts. Depending on the court’s rules of procedure, they may be
invited by the parties or appointed by the courts. Furthermore, economists
may act as factual witnesses and assist the judge in grasping the economic
concepts that permeate the body of law governing the regulation of utilities.21
The second one is indirect and refers to the increased recourse to economic
evidence and analysis when interpreting the economic concepts enshrined in
the body of law governing the regulation of utilities. For example, EC
Regulation 2887/2000 requires notified operators (ie those operators of fixed
public telephone networks designated by the national regulatory authorities as
having significant market power) to ‘charge prices for unbundled access to the
local loop and related facilities set on the basis of cost-orientation’.22 In the
same vein, the US Telecommunications Act 1996 instructs federal regulators to
disallow prices that are not ‘just and reasonable’.23 Hence, economic evidence
may inform both questions of law (the legal meaning to be accorded to the
statutory term ‘reasonable price’) and questions of fact (whether the factual
nature of the regulatory price-setting process comes within the legal definition
of a ‘reasonable price’ for the purposes of the statute)—if one adheres to such a
distinction.24
The above-mentioned direct and indirect influence of economic evidence in
regulatory disputes has two crucial implications for the adjudication of
regulatory disputes. First, economic evidence presents cognitive challenges
for the judge, in the sense that he is called upon to rely on economic authority
as opposed to legal authority as a conceptual basis of his reasoning. To take
one example, without relying on economic authority, it is difficult to determine
whether the factual nature of the rate-making process comes within the legal
definition of a ‘just and reasonable’ price. In such cases, the judge may seek
interpretive guidance in ‘soft law’ instruments, such as guidelines and
recommendations issued by the EC and the US federal agencies, which often
incorporate economic authority. These documents reflect a hybrid discourse, as
they are informed by communications characterising the domains of both law
and economics. In fact, ‘soft law’ can be viewed as the institutional
embodiment of the ‘conversations’ between lawyers and economists working
21 See eg BT v OFCOM (PPC) [2011] CAT 5 (PPC case), para 66.
22 Regulation (EC) 2887/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2000 on
unbundled access to the local loop [2000] OJ L336/4, art 3, 3.
23 US Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub L No 104-104, 110 Stat 56, codified at 47 USC §§151 et seq.
24 RJ Allen and MS Pardo, ‘The Myth of the Law—Fact Distinction’ (2003) 97 Nw Univ L Rev 1769.
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together in the regulatory agency.25 The judge may also rely on the assistance
of an economic expert. In doing so, he may be said to admit limitations to his
authority to proclaim ‘what the law is’, precisely because the economic
dimension of the law invites the assistance of an economic expert.26 Scot
Brewer summarises this phenomenon in the term ‘epistemic deference’.27
Secondly, economic evidence frequently informs policy decisions which
involve technical aspects (eg the design of the appropriate pricing method-
ology) and value judgments. For example, the implementation of the
unbundling provisions of deregulatory acts in the telecommunications
sector—those provisions which require the incumbent to share the components
of its network (eg switches, trunks, loops) with a rival party—involves a huge
trade-off between the objectives of static28 and dynamic29 efficiency.30
Mandating access to all components of the network can potentially diminish
the incentives of the new entrants to build their own network infrastructure,
and those of the incumbents to keep up and improve their property.31 Denying
access, on the other hand, may increase the incumbents’ market power, thus
impeding competition from new entrants. In such cases, the courts are
confronted with a policy choice and judges are required to assess whether the
economic methodologies employed by the regulatory agency are fit for purpose
and whether the inferences drawn from economic analysis are sufficiently
robust to support the regulator’s policy decision.
B. The Case of Polycentric Regulatory Disputes
The challenges posed by economic evidence merit special attention in the case
of regulatory disputes that present ‘polycentric’ elements.32 In the Fullerian
sense, a polycentric task is one that encompasses a large and complicated web
of interdependent relationships.33 In such cases, a decision taken may affect
many actors, thus leading to a fluid state of affairs if all affected interests are
taken into account. However, polycentricity may as well refer to situations
where a decision affecting one actor could have a different set of repercussions
for other parties, leading to a redefinition of the parties affected.
25 J Black, ‘Talking about Regulation’ [1998] PL 77; I Lianos, ‘Lost in Translation? Towards a Theory of
Economic Transplants’ (2009) 62 CLP 346.
26 S Brewer, ‘Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process’ (1998) 107 Yale LJ 1535, 1586; I
Lianos, ‘‘‘Judging Economists’’: Economic Expertise in Competition Law Litigation: A European View’ in I
Lianos and I Kokkoris (eds), The Reform of EC Competition Law: New Challenges (Kluwer Law International
2010) 189.
27 Brewer, ibid.
28 Static efficiency occurs when marginal production costs are minimised (productive efficiency) or when the
goods and services are allocated to the uses in which they have the highest value (allocative efficiency).
29 Dynamic efficiency relates to demand in investment and innovation.
30 The mandatory unbundling provisions are enshrined in Section 251(d) of the US Telecommunications Act
of 1996. In the EU see Regulation (EC) 2887/2000 (n 22).
31 For a discussion see AT&T Corp v Utilities Board, 525 US 366 (1999).
32 L Fuller, ‘The Forms and Limits of Adjudication’ (1978) 92 Harvard L Rev 353.
33 ibid 394.
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A perfect example of a polycentric task is how to set the appropriate
regulatory access price; that is, the price under which competing firms will have
access to essential inputs (eg the electricity transmission network) provided by
the incumbent. In access pricing the regulator has to strike a balance between
the divergent interests of the new entrants, the incumbent and ultimately the
consumers. The best outcome of this balancing exercise demands comprehen-
sion of a highly complex range of cause–effect relationships. First, there is a
distributional concern. Pricing at marginal cost maximises efficiency, but does
not compensate the incumbent for his fixed costs related to investments in the
network. Secondly and relatedly, there is a dynamic efficiency concern. In
other words, the regulator has to ensure that the method employed will also
contribute to the long-term interest of the consumer, the encouragement of
technological innovation, and the growth and viability of the sector at issue.
However, little guidance is provided in the agencies’ governing statutes in such
cases, hence allowing the regulators a large measure of policy discretion to
balance the competing interests at stake.34
Fuller argued that polycentric disputes are inherently unsuited for adjudi-
cation and thus best resolved through managerial discretion or through
negotiation and contract,35 or left to the forces of the market.36 Nonetheless,
Fuller accepted that polycentric elements are present in all problems resolved
by adjudication. What becomes important is knowing when ‘the polycentric
elements have become so significant and predominant that the proper limits of
adjudication have been reached’.37 It follows that the polycentric dimension of
regulatory disputes does not necessarily imply the removal of the court’s
supervision altogether (non-justiciability), but may warrant a special weight to
be accorded to the economic assessments of the regulatory agency. This,
however, as we shall see, presupposes a case-by-case assessment of the factors
that may attenuate the polycentric dimension of the dispute in question, thus
making it amenable to the adjudicative process.38
If the regulatory and adjudicative institutional process are imperfect alterna-
tives, as this article contends, the challenges posed by economic evidence in
regulatory disputes should be addressed by a comparative institutional analysis of
these imperfect alternative choices to select the least imperfect one. However,
this is not as simple as it may sound. The examination of the different avenues
for challenging regulatory decisions in the US and the UK, undertaken in the
following section, will reveal that a plethora of imperfect decision makers are
involved in the regulatory and adjudicative process.
34 See eg Telecommunications Act of 1996, Preamble (n 23); Directive 2002/19/EC on access to, and
interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities [2002] OJ L108/51, art 13.
35 Fuller (n 32) 400.
36 ibid 398.
37 ibid 397.
38 See J King, ‘The Pervasiveness of Polycentricity’ [2008] PL 101.
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3. ‘Imperfect Alternatives’: Avenues for Challenging Regulatory
Decisions in the US and the UK
The US and the UK differ radically with respect to the procedures available for
the review of economic evidence enshrined in regulatory decisions. First, in the
case of the US, federal regulatory agencies’ decisions are reviewed by means of
judicial review only. In contrast, in the UK, the routes of both judicial review
and merits review are offered to challenge sector-specific regulators’ decisions.
Secondly, as will be shown, in the US, review of economic evidence is
‘internal’, meaning that ‘it takes place within the institution in which the
original decision maker was located at the time the decision was made’.39 In
contrast, in the UK it is usually ‘external’ to the regulatory agency, as it takes
place in a different institution, the Competition and Markets Authority
(CMA).40 Finally, while the US has resisted the idea of establishing specialised
courts for the resolution of regulatory disputes, in the UK a specialist tribunal,
the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT),41 has been established, charged with
the review of economic evidence implicated in regulatory disputes.
A. The Process for Regulatory Appeals in the US
The US has adopted an administrative litigation model for the review of
economic evidence, which reflects its long tradition of administrative adjudi-
cation in the regulation of natural monopolies. To explain this further, when a
decision involving economic evidence made by the FERC or the FCC is
challenged or disputed, a common pattern is for the decision to be reviewed
first by an adjudicative institution embedded in the regulatory agency, that of
the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). Crucially, the ALJ is functionally
separated from the investigatory and prosecution arm of the agency.
The administrative litigation model is very similar to court adjudication, ‘as
it involves the participation of the affected interests in the decision-making
process through proofs and reasoned arguments’.42 The administrative hearing
is trial-like, with testimony and evidence presented by trial staff, such as
attorneys and trial staff, who assist the ALJ and participate in the hearings as
impartial representatives of the public interest. They may also serve as expert
witnesses.43 The opportunity for oral testimony by witnesses and the
opportunity for cross-examination enable the agency to test its factual record.
The process is governed by the provisions of the APA, a default procedural
framework governing federal regulatory policy making. The ALJ’s initial or
recommended decision is final, subject to a de novo review or appeal by the
39 P Cane, Administrative Tribunals and Adjudication (Hart Publishing 2010) 7.
40 Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, ss 25–8.
41 Established by the Enterprise Act 2002.
42 Fuller (n 32) 365.
43 See 18 CFR 385.102(b).
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regulatory agency itself—either by the commissioners or by members of the
agency’s governing body. Agency heads thus perform a ‘second pair of eyes’
review of the decisions and are free to substitute their judgment for that of the
ALJ on questions of law, fact and discretion.44 If the regulatory agency affirms
the original decision or varies it in a way that does not satisfy the affected party,
that party may seek external review of the decision in the federal courts on the
various grounds of review listed in the APA. Federal courts are limited to the
record produced by the agency itself and refrain from a de novo examination of
the facts. It is not for the courts to substitute their views for that of the agency,
nor to provide a reasonable basis for the agency’s action.45
Although, in principle, all of the US circuit courts can hear petitions for
review of federal regulatory agencies, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia (DC Circuit) merits special attention. Technically speaking, the DC
Circuit is a regional court staffed by judges from all over the US. However, its
location, right in the heart of the federal’s government capital, and its exclusive
jurisdiction over a variety of legal challenges to administrative law action have
rendered it a ‘semi-specialised’ court.46 Although the DC Circuit is the court
of final resort for most cases, there is always the possibility of further appeal to
the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court enjoys certiorari jurisdiction in
reviewing lower courts’ judgments de novo.
B. The Process for Regulatory Appeals in the UK
In line with the principles of subsidiarity and national procedural autonomy,47
the UK enjoys ample discretion in determining the means available for
challenging regulatory decisions—subject, of course, to the twin principles of
equivalence and effectiveness.48 While, in the original legislation establishing
the utility regulators, regulatory decisions could only be challenged by way of
judicial review before the generalist High Court and on limited grounds (ie
illegality, irrationality or procedural impropriety), today the routes of both
appeal and judicial review are available. In fact, the introduction of statutory
rights of appeal in the late 1990s have gradually led to the marginalisation of
judicial review as the primary means to challenge regulatory decisions.49
Furthermore, the establishment of the specialist CAT has seen the High Court
largely replaced as the primary venue for hearing such challenges. Contrary to
44 APA, 5 USC § 557(b).
45 Universal Camera Corp v NLRB, 340 US 474 (1951).
46 JM Golden, ‘The Federal Circuit and the DC Circuit: Comparative Trials of Two Semi-Specialised Courts’
(2010) 78 Geo Wash L Rev 553.
47 The principle of subsidiarity is laid down in art 5, 3 TEU. The doctrine of national procedural autonomy
has been developed by the CJEU in its case law, starting with Case C-33/76 Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG and Rewe-
Zentral AG v Landwirtschaftskammer fu¨r das Saarland [1976] ECR 1989.
48 See Case C-462/99 Connect Austria Gesellschaft fu¨r Telekommunikation GmbH/Telekom-Control-Kommission,
and Mobilkom Austria AG [2003] ECR I-5197, para 35.
49 See Telecommunications (Appeals) Regulations 1999, SI 1999/3180l.
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the ordinary courts, the CAT’s bench combines legal and non-legal expertise in
areas such as economics, business and accountancy.50 Crucially, the CAT
enjoys both statutory review (similar to common law judicial review) and
statutory appeal jurisdiction (where it engages with the factual merits of the
case). It can be argued that Parliament dealt with the limitations of judicial
review by providing broader appeal rights to the CAT, which would not be
subject to the restrictions of judicial review.
The process for the review of regulatory decisions is, however, largely
inconsistent. Financially significant regulatory decisions for the investors and
ultimately the consumers (eg price control decisions, licence modifications,
references concerning non-licensable activities in the gas, electricity and energy
code modifications appeals) can be appealed on the merits to the CMA.51 The
CMA enjoys broad access to epistemic competence as well as access to a pool
of investigators, including Utilities Panel members.52 Furthermore, its in-depth
inquisitorial approach allows for a better appreciation of the underlying issues
in price control and licence modification cases than the CAT’s adversarial
approach. In the energy appeal process, as a result of the introduction of the
EU Third Energy Package reforms,53 standing rules have been widened and all
licensees (eg network companies, generators or retailers) and consumer
representative bodies (eg Citizens Advice) have a right of appeal in relation
to licence decisions that materially affect them.54
In contrast, OFCOM’s licencing decisions under the Communications Act
2003 are subject to an appeal on the merits before the CAT by any party
affected by the decision. This full appeal on the merits is due to the
requirement of the EU Framework Directive for electronic communications.55
A further appeal on point of law can be brought to the Court of Appeal on
behalf of a party or anyone else with sufficient interest.56 However, in the case
where an appeal raises a price control matter, this is hived off by the CAT and
referred to the CMA for determination ‘on the merits’. In such cases,
participation in the CMA proceedings is limited to the parties to the case, the
appellant, the regulator and any interveners who are admitted by the CAT.
Finally, where the sectoral regulators exercise concurrent powers with the
CMA under the Competition Act 1998, there is a right of appeal on the merits
to the CAT and then on a point of law to the Court of Appeal. In such cases,
50 Enterprise Act 2002, sch 2, para 1(1); Competition Appeal Tribunal, Guide to Proceedings (October
2005).
51 Gas Act 1986, s 23B–G; Electricity Act 1989, s 11C–H; Water Industry Act 1991, ss 14–16.
52 Utilities Act 2000, s 104(1) and (2).
53The Third Energy Package comprises two Directives and three Regulations <http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_
electricity/legislation/third_legislative_package_en.htm> last accessed 17 September 2015.
54 See eg CC02/07, E.ON UK Plc and GEMA and British Gas Trading Limited—Decision and Order of the
Competition Commission (10 July 2007).
55 See Directive 2009/140/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009
amending Directives 2002/21/EC on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks
and services, art 4, 1.
56 Communications Act 2003, s 192.
10 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies
 at U
niversity of Reading on January 8, 2016
http://ojls.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
the CAT’s powers extend to substituting the decision for that of the regulator.
In contrast, challenges against penalties and companies’ licence conditions are
heard by the High Court on grounds similar to those of judicial review.57
This brief excursion into the avenues for challenging regulatory decisions
revealed that the various decision makers involved in the regulatory and
adjudicative process differ significantly regarding their degree of economic
expertise in regulatory matters and the extent and quality of participation of
affected interests. The latter feature is of particular importance in the case of
polycentric disputes. Finally, they are constrained by different procedures for
the assessment of economic evidence. Hence, a comparative institutional
competencies approach to the appropriate scope of review of economic
evidence would necessarily have to take into account factors other than the
relative economic expertise of the decision makers. Those factors would
include fact-finding competence, evidence-gathering tools, access to epistemic
competence, the standard of review (ie merits review or judicial review) applied
and the standing rules in place. Prior to exploring this proposition further, it is
necessary to first examine the doctrinal positions advanced in the US and the
UK for the substantive review of regulatory agency discretion.
4. Substantive Review of Regulatory Discretion in the
US and the UK
A well-documented divergence exists in the doctrinal positions governing the
substantive review of regulatory agency discretion in the US and the UK,
reflected in the high-intensity ‘hard look’ review and the low-intensity
rationality review, respectively. This divergence is attributed to the broader
historical, constitutional and institutional differences between the two jurisdic-
tions.58 To give one example, the US Constitution’s separation of powers and
the related difficulty of applying the system of checks and balances to the
‘fourth branch of government’59 have generated far more institutional tensions
between the courts and the administrative agencies than in the UK, where
agencies are controlled by a single Executive.
Furthermore, these standards of review are inevitably influenced by the
judges’ assumptions about the place of judicial review in their constitutional
order, as well as by the perception of their role in the regulatory process. For
instance, as will be shown, the very promulgation of the ‘hard look’ review in
57 With the exception of appeals against penalties for breach of the transmission constraint licence condition
under the Energy Act 2010, which are heard by the CAT; BT and Others v OFCOM [2012] EWCA Civ 1002.
58 For the most recent analysis see EC Ip, ‘Taking a ‘‘Hard Look’’ at ‘‘Irrationality’’: Substantive Review of
Administrative Discretion in the US and UK Supreme Courts’ (2014) 34(3) OJLS 481.
59 JO Freedman, Crisis and Legitimacy: The Administrative Process and American Government (CUP 1978) ch 2.
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the early 1970s illustrates that federal courts had assumed a corrective role for
the alleged failures of the regulatory process to regulate in the public interest.60
In contrast, the irrationality review in the realm of utilities regulation emerged
inter alia as a reaction to the apparent incapacity of the courts to deal with the
complexity of the regulators’ economic assessments following the privatisation
of utilities.
This section will take a closer look at the evolution of these divergent
doctrinal positions and their application in regulatory disputes.
A. The Scope and Intensity of Substantive Review of Regulatory
Discretion in the US
As a general rule, the discretionary assessments of the FERC and the FCC are,
at the minimum, subject to the ‘arbitrary, capricious [or] abuse of discretion’
test of the APA.61 Nonetheless, the availability and scope of review are largely
determined by whether the regulatory agency’s action involves rule making or
adjudication, according to the distinction firmly embedded in the APA.
Rule making resembles legislative action, whereas adjudication is similar to
court proceedings. Two kinds of rule making are envisioned by the APA:
formal and informal. Formal rule making refers to ‘rules required by the
statute to be made on the record after an opportunity for an agency hearing’.62
Informal rule making, otherwise known as ‘notice-and-comment rule making’,
is triggered by a notice to the public of the ‘subjects and issues involved’63
followed by an opportunity for outsiders to provide comments or objections to
the proposed rule. Generally, informal rule making generates rules made
pursuant to congressionally delegated authority. The legislative rules, if valid,
operate like a statute.
Adjudication is defined broadly in the APA as a ‘process for the formulation
of an order’.64 An order binds only the party to the proceedings, but some
orders, such as those issued at the conclusion of the FERC’s adjudication,
operate as precedent.65 Both formal rule making and formal adjudication
require prescribed hearing procedures with the aim of creating a factual
empirical basis upon which the agency will form its decision. Formal
adjudication, however, affords a more limited class of persons—often the
parties—to present evidence and to have the opportunity for cross-
examination.66
60 See TW Merrill, ‘Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967–1983’ (1997) 72 Chicago-Kent L Rev 1039,
1056.
61 Above n 12.
62 5 USC § 553(c).
63 5 USC § 553(b)(3).
64 5 USC § 551(7).
65 J Rossi, ‘Redeeming Judicial Review: The Hard Look Doctrine and Federal Regulatory Efforts to
Restructure the Electric Utility Industry’ (1994) Wisconsin L Rev 763, 833.
66 5 USC §§ 556–7.
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Although the APA envisions two kinds of routes that the agency may follow
to effectuate its statutory mandate, in reality the latter is free to select from a
wider set of policy-making tools.67 The FERC, for example, is authorised to
promulgate legislative rules, conduct administrative adjudication and/or initiate
judicial enforcement. It can be argued that, as a general pattern, the FCC relies
heavily on rule making,68 whereas the FERC relies on both adjudication and
legislative rules.69 Crucially, rate making for electric and gas utilities is
classified as rule making, but is conducted very much like formal adjudication
before an ALJ.70
Rules made on the ‘record’ are subject to the ‘substantial evidence
standard’.71 The same standard applies to an agency’s factual findings in the
course of adjudication, which will be assessed to see whether it is based on the
‘whole record’.72 It is important to stress that in such cases federal courts rarely
undertake a de novo examination of the economic facts, as these have been
largely established in the course of the complex fact-finding process undertaken
by the ALJ. Indeed, the records of the FCC and the FERC cases illustrate that
courts increasingly review agencies’ action under the arbitrary and capricious
test of the APA deferring to agency findings of fact, provided they are
supported by substantial evidence on the record.73
However, neither the text nor the legislative history of the APA clarifies the
intensity of the arbitrary and capricious test. Over time, it has given rise to
both light-touch review and intrusive review of administrative action; the latter
commonly referred to as ‘hard look’ review. Developed by the DC Circuit in
the late 1960s and early 1970s in response to agencies’ turning to informal rule
making as a means of policy making and to the belief in ‘agency capture’, ‘hard
look’ review demanded an intrusive review of the agency’s action. In the legal
academy, US administrative law scholars supported this position by advocating
a more ‘stringent judicial review’74 of the regulatory agency’s actions, which
would be less deferential to political outcomes,75 as well as a more intrusive
judicial review of agency rule making so as to combat agency capture.76 The
doctrine also required that agencies satisfy the court that they had considered
all of the dimensions of the matter before it and that they had engaged in
67 EM Magill, ‘Agency Choice of Policymaking Form’ (2004) 71 U Chicago L Rev 1383.
68 MC Dollarhide, ‘Surrogate Rule Making: Problems and Possibilities under the Administrative Procedure
Act’ (1988) 61 S Cal L Rev 1017, 1032.
69 Rossi (n 65).
70 See Shell Oil Co v FPC, 520 F2d 1061 (5th Cir 1975). See further RJ Pierce Jr, ‘The Choice between
Rulemaking and Adjudication for Formulating and Implementing Energy Policy’ (1979) 30 Hastings LJ 1.
71 5 USC § 706(2)(E).
72 5 USC § 706.
73 American Gas Association v FERC, 593 F3d 14, 19 (DC Cir 2010); Achernar Broad v FCC, 62 F3d 1441,
1445 (DC Cir 1995); Covad Communications Committee v FCC, 450 F3d 528, 531, 533–4 (DC Cir 2006).
74 D Farber and P Frickey, ‘The Jurisprudence of Public Choice’ (1987) 65 Texas L Rev 873, 908.
75 E Rubin, ‘Public Choice in Practice and Theory’ (1993) 81 Cal L Rev 1657, 1670; S Rose-Ackerman,
‘Judicial Review and the Power of the Purse’ (1992) 12 Int’l Rev L & Econ 191.
76 CR Sunstein, ‘Interest Groups in American Public Law’ (1985) 38 Stan L Rev 29, 61–3.
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reasoned decision making when claiming discretion.77 Additionally, they should
justify departures from past policies and allow effective participation in
regulatory decision making by a broader range of stakeholders. The Supreme
Court endorsed the doctrine in the State Farm case,78 stating that a reviewing
court ought to test the quality of the agency’s reasoning process as to whether
‘the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors’; whether
‘there has been a clear error of judgment’; and whether:
the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider,
entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation
for its decision that runs contrary to the evidence before the agency, or is so
implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of
agency expertise.79
Hence, the Court embraced not only the procedural and but also the
substantive dimensions of the ‘hard look’ review.
In the realm of utilities regulation, the ‘hard look’ review has been applied in
judicial review of the FERC’s and the FCC’s exercise of policy-making
discretion in light of a technical or economic record, such as the one that exists
in rate-setting cases. For example, in reviewing the FCC’s and the FERC’s
exercise of discretion in such cases, the federal courts employ a rationality-type
review to examine whether the agency took into account ‘the relevant data and
articulate[d] a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational
connection between the facts found and the choices made’.80 Rate setting is an
inherently complex process that involves economic, technical and policy
assessments.81 Although judges routinely hold that the implementation of the
legislative requirement of ‘just, reasonable and non-discriminatory rates’
involves ‘policy judgements that lie at the core of the regulatory mission’,82
the application of the ‘hard look’ review has enabled federal courts to reverse,
vacate or remand a number of the FERC’s orders on the grounds that the
latter failed to engage in ‘reasoned decision making’ or failed to explain its
underlying policy;83 it departed from prior policy84 or precedent;85 and it
refused to consider new evidence.86
77 See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v Volpe, 401 US 402 (1971).
78 Motor Vehicle Mfrs Ass’n v State Farm Mot Auto Ins Co, 463 US 29 (1983) (State Farm).
79 ibid para 43.
80 Midwest ISO Transmission Owners v FERC, 373 F3d 1361, 1368 (DC Cir 2004) (quoting State Farm).
81 Alcoa v FERC, 564 F3d 1342 (DC Cir 2009).
82 Town of Norwood v FERC, 962, F2d 20, 22 (DC Cir 1992); Entergy Services Inc v FERC, 319 F3d 536, 541
(DC Cir 2003).
83 Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp v FERC, 54 F3d 893 (DC Cir 1995); Sithe/Independence Power v FERC,
165 F3d 944 (DC Cir 1999); Michigan Public Power Agency v FERC, 405 F3d 8 (DC Cir 2005).
84 Louisiana Public Service Commission v FERC, 184 F3d 892, 230–1 (DC Cir 1999).
85 Williston Basin Interstate Pipeline Co v FERC, 165 F3d 54 (DC Cir 1999).
86 Port of Seattle, Washington v FERC, 499 F3d 1016 (9th Cir 2007).
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B. The Scope and Intensity of Substantive Review of Regulatory
Discretion in the UK
The early case law, in the wake of utilities privatisation, suggests that the low-
intensity rationality review applied to the regulators’ discretionary assessments
was informed by constitutional considerations as well as by the apparent
incapacity of the courts to deal with the complexity of economic appraisals.
Substantive decisions were challenged under the standard of Wednesbury
unreasonableness. Under this test of review, courts could set aside the
conclusion reached by a public authority entrusted by Parliament with
discretion on a matter if this decision was wholly absurd—that is, it is a
‘decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral
standards that no sensible person who had his mind to the question to be
decided could have arrived at it’.87 It was thought that limiting substantive
review in this way would prevent courts from entering into a constitutionally
forbidden territory. The deferential posture was further justified by the
regulator’s special knowledge and expertise in regulatory matters.88 Thus, in
the Cellcom89 case concerning licence modifications in telecoms, Lightman J
strongly suggested that:
Where the Act has conferred the decision-making function on the Director, it is for
him, and him alone, to consider the economic arguments, weigh the compelling
considerations and arrive at a judgment . . . If (as I have stated) the court should be
very slow to impugn decisions of fact made by an expert body and experienced
decision-maker, it must surely be even slower to impugn his educated prophesies and
predictions for the future.90
The judicial reluctance extended to the regulator’s findings of fact, which
formed the basis of his discretionary judgment. In a number of cases, English
courts have held that the existence or non-existence of fact should be left to the
judgment or discretion of the decision maker.91
The input into the courts’ reasoning of the above-mentioned considerations
led to a long-lived harmonious relationship between the judges and the
regulatory agencies: the judges would focus on the process of regulatory decision
making, whereas the agencies would focus on the substance thereof. The
absence of a proportionality test for substantive review that would require the
courts ‘to assess the balance the decision-maker has struck’,92 paying attention
to the ‘relative weight of interests and considerations’,93 subjected the
regulatory agencies’ decisions only to the ‘monolithic’ Wednesbury test of
87 CCSU (n 15).
88 R (London and Continental Stations and Property Ltd) v The Rail Regulator [2003] EWHC 2607 (Admin).
89 R v Director General of Telecommunications, ex p Cellcom Ltd and Others case [1999] ECC 314, para 29.
90 ibid para 26.
91 R v Independent Television Commission (ITC), ex p Virgin Television Ltd [1996] EMLR 31.
92 R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] UKHL 26 [2001] 2 AC 5.
93 ibid.
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extreme unreasonableness—a test that is very difficult for the claimant to
satisfy.94 The economic evidence enshrined in regulatory decisions was largely
immune from judicial scrutiny, giving rise to a controversy over limited
regulatory accountability. The judicially created boundaries of ‘no-go’ areas of
review allowed regulators to operate largely unchecked; rarely did they state
reasons or provide clear criteria for their decisions.95
However, the force of low-intensity rationality review seems to have dwindled
in recent years, especially in light of constitutional and jurisprudential
developments that have allowed a more demanding judicial scrutiny than
traditional Wednesbury review. Such developments are better captured in the
notion of a ‘multi-streamed jurisdiction’,96 a term employed to denote that
judicial review now encompasses not only common law principles, but also
relevant applications of EU law and of the European Convention of Human
Rights (ECHR).
Hence, claimants wishing to challenge the regulators’ economic assessments
may demand a more stringent review of agency’s discretion based, inter alia, on
the ‘European’ proportionality head of review.97 BT v OFCOM98 is a case in
point. In this case, the claimants argued that judicial review of the CMA’s price
control determinations under section 193(7) of the Communications Act 2003
should encompass a ‘European’ proportionality head of review, which would be
more stringent than the ‘English’ standard of review. The CAT, however,
refused to do so in ‘the absence of an authoritative statement made that as a
general proposition, English law has adopted proportionality as an independent
ground of review’.99
Similarly, in the T-Mobile100 case, the general principle of EU law relating to
effective judicial protection was successfully invoked by OFCOM in litigation
concerning the auction of spectrum licences. The incumbents tried to
substitute judicial review proceedings before the High Court with the lengthier
proceedings before the CAT, relying on the requirement of the Framework
Directive for electronic communications for an ‘effective appeals mechan-
ism’.101 The Court of Appeal stressed the obligation on a national court ‘to
94 R v Trade and Industry Secretary, ex p Lonrho plc [1989] 2 All ER 609, [1989] 1 WLR 525 [1989] BCC 63;
Cityhook Ltf and another, R (on the application of) v Office of Fair Trading and others [2009] EWHC (Admin) 57,
paras 136 and 165.
AQ3:95 C Veljanovski, ‘The Regulation Game’ in C Veljanovski (ed), Regulators and the Market (The Institute
of Economic Affairs 1991) 17.
96 R Rawlings, ‘Modeling Judicial Review’ (2008) 61 CLP 95, 96.
97 See R (On the Application of Lumsdon and Others) v Legal Services Board [2015] UKSC 41.
98 BT v OFCOM [2012] CAT 11.
99 ibid para 128.
100 T-Mobile (UK) Ltd v Office of Communications [2008] EWCA Civ 1373.
101 ibid. The principle of effective judicial protection is elaborated in Case C-432/05 Unibet v Justitiekanslem
[2007] ECR I-2271.
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adapt its procedures as far as possible to ensure Community rights are
protected’,102 and ruled that the High Court could also adapt its procedure to
ensure a variable intensity of review.103
Furthermore, the provisions of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and
Freedoms that codifies procedural rights (eg right to access to justice and fair
trial) and substantive rights (ie the right to property) may also constitute
grounds for annulling regulatory decisions implementing EU law.
Finally, the incorporation of the ECHR into English law by the Human
Rights Act 1998 (HRA) has also opened up new attractive routes for firms and
individuals wishing to challenge regulatory decisions. For example, in Marcic104
a claim was brought against a sewage provider in the tort of nuisance and
under the HRA for breaches of article 1 of the First Protocol, providing for the
peaceful enjoyment of possessions, and article 8, providing the right to respect
for one’s home, for repeated flooding of the claimant’s property. The House of
Lords rejected the claim on the grounds that there was a statutory scheme for
regulating the water industry, which struck a reasonable balance between
Convention rights and the interests of the community as a whole. It was thus
the regulator’s role to decide on the application of Convention rights in this
area of economic regulation.105
A further attractive area is that of the recovery of damages under section 9(3)
of the HRA for breach of Convention rights. The Infinis106 case is a case in
point. The Court of Appeal upheld the award of damages based on an
infringement of article 1 of the First Protocol. OFGEM was held to have made
an error of law when interpreting the statutory regime for subsidising
renewable energy that resulted in Infinis being refused Renewables
Obligation Certificates (ROCs), a financial benefit to which it was legally
entitled.107 Given that, at the time of trial, the ROCs were out of date, the
judge decided that the claimant would not derive just satisfaction from
quashing and mandatory orders alone. No claim in private law was available to
it. Indeed, the only means by which Infinis could recover what it was entitled
to under the statutory scheme was through the award of damages.108
The foregoing analysis revealed that although the doctrinal positions
presupposed the institutional advantages and disadvantages of courts when
determining the degree of deference to regulatory decisions, they have since
evolved to include varying intensities of review. There is, however, still room
for these to become aligned with the institutional and procedural framework
governing the regulatory appeals process. For instance, how would the doctrine
102 ibid para 22.
103 ibid para 23.
104 See eg Peter Marcic v Thames Water Utilities Limited [2002] EWCA Civ 65.
105 Marcic v Thames Water Utilities Ltd [2003] UKHL 66.
106 R (on the application of Infinis Plc) v Ofgem [2011] EWHC 1873 (Admin).
107 ibid para 103.
108 ibid para 106.
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of deference to agency’s expertise, as applied by the UK generalist High Court,
be accommodated in a specialist tribunal, such as the CAT? In such a case,
blanket deference on the basis of the regulator’s expertise is unconvincing, as it
is rooted in the anachronistic assumption that the regulator is the only one who
possesses the special knowledge. Furthermore, one may question whether the
generalist judge is institutionally well suited for strict policy review of such
disputes, given his informational limitations and political insulation. Will a
‘hard look’ style of review lead to a better administrative policy, or will it
discourage the agency from acquiring policy-relevant expertise? The next
section will discuss how a balance of comparative institutional competencies
approach to deference may overcome these issues and ensure that substantive
review of regulatory discretion becomes attuned to the nature of economic
evidence and the polycentric dimension of regulatory disputes.
5. A Balance of Comparative Institutional Competencies
Approach
At their most basic, comparative institutional competence considerations are
built on the assumption that one branch of government is better at performing
a specified function than another. As used here, a balance of comparative
institutional competence approach to deference envisions that, when faced with
the agencies’ discretionary economic assessments, courts should weigh their
relative institutional advantages and disadvantages in resolving such issues
against those of the regulators, before deciding on the appropriate amount of
deference to accord to the agency’s assessments.
A. The Comparative Institutional Disadvantages of Courts
As compared to the regulatory agencies, generalist courts suffer from a number
of institutional disadvantages in assessing the different manifestations of
economic evidence in regulatory disputes. These include: (i) lack of economic
expertise; (ii) limited access to information; (iii) lack of requisite institutional
legitimacy, especially in addressing polycentric disputes and questions
connoting broad policy considerations; and (iv) susceptibility to ‘minoritarian’
bias.
(i) Lack of economic expertise
One of the most obvious institutional disadvantages of ordinary courts relates
to their lack of expertise in regulatory matters. Judges sitting on such courts do
not appear to have the special skills and expert knowledge necessary to assess
economic evidence; nor can they easily acquire such skills. For instance, they
do not possess cross-disciplinary expertise in economics and/or business and
accountancy, as members of the CAT do, and they deal with a much wider
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spectrum of disputes than just regulatory disputes. The regulatory agencies, on
the other hand, have in recent years invested heavily in economic expertise. On
both sides of the Atlantic, professional experts drawn from the fields of
economics, statistics and finance form part of the regulatory agencies’ in-house
expertise.109 Furthermore, economists often hold key positions in the agencies
and most utility regulators have a panel of external economic consultants to
complement the in-house economic skills.110 Finally, the fact that the agency is
endowed by statute with primary responsibility for the regulation of the sector
in question coupled with the legislative requirement of evidence-based policy
making strengthens its incentives to employ and rely on economic expertise.111
The court’s lack of economic expertise provides a basis for judicial deference
to the agency’s economic assessments grounded on the latter’s ‘epistemic
authority’.112 In such a case, the judge acknowledges its ‘epistemic deficit’113 in
evaluating the economic evidence enshrined in regulatory decisions and
accords greater weight to the judgment of the agency, which is closer to the
facts on the ground. Aileen Kavanagh refers to this kind of deference as
‘substantial’114 deference, in the course of which the judge recognises his
‘institutional shortcomings’115 in respect of an issue. It follows that failure on
the part of the court to afford substantial deference to the regulator will lead to
the court giving a wrong pronouncement on the issue at stake. Substantial
deference, in turn, differs from the ‘minimal’ deference that is owed to the
agency for constitutional reasons.116
(ii) Limited access to information
Another comparative institutional disadvantage of the courts is their limited access
to information that is relevant to the dispute in question. Judges depend for their
information on the evidence that is put before them in a case. In other words, they
are situated decision makers, called to decide upon regulatory disputes on an ad
hoc basis. This is especially the case in the context of adversarial proceedings,
whereby the adjudicator is informed solely by the litigating parties and thus is
significantly insulated from the whole spectrum of relevant information. The
regulatory agency, on the other hand, has a continuous involvement in the
administration of the sector it supervises and enjoys broad access to information
regarding the problems and characteristics thereof. This, in turn, may warrant a
109 See L Schrefler, Economic Knowledge in Regulation: The Use of Expertise by Independent Agencies (ECPR
Press 2013).
110 Notable economists served as DG’s in the UK’s regulators following privatisation. Chief Economists have
been appointed in all US and UK utility regulators.
111 RC Taylor, ‘Embedding Evidence Based Policy Making in Regulatory Organisation: A Case Study of the
UK Office of Communications—OFCOM’ (University of Oxford 2009) 125–5.
112 See P Horwitz, ‘Three Faces of Deference’ (2008) 83 Notre Dame L Rev 1061, 1079–90.
113 Brewer (n 26) 1586.
114 A Kavanagh, ‘Deference or Defiance’ in G Huscroft (ed), Expounding the Constitution: Essays in
Constitutional Theory (CUP 2008) 191.
115 ibid 139, 192.
116 ibid.
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high degree of deference to the regulator’s assessments because of his superior
institutional capacity to gather and assess relevant information.
There are several ways by which the regulatory agency can acquire such
information. First, it can acquire the information during the consultation
period that precedes the promulgation of a new rule. All UK utility regulators
enjoy statutory information-gathering powers,117 which they may use if they
believe it is appropriate to do so. Both the consultation and the pre-
consultation process allow the gathering of relevant market data and the
exchanges of views with stakeholders and affected interests, and therefore
enable epistemic communities representing different values to be represented in
the regulatory process. This, in turn, allows a broader representation of the
diverse set of consumer preferences, which strengthens the regulatory agency’s
capacity to assess the effects of its interventions. In the US, the main
mechanism for the provision of relevant information is the ‘notice-and-
comment’ rule-making process. The FERC, for example, frequently solicits
comments from regulated industries, competitors and interested citizens and
organisations, collectively referred to as interest groups.118
Secondly, the regulatory agency collects relevant information during the
enforcement stage. Evidence-gathering tools are important in this respect. For
example, in the US context, the APA has endorsed fairly liberal standards for
the admissibility of evidence in formal proceedings,119 whereas agencies are
free to complement the standards of the APA with those found in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure or in the Federal Rules of Evidence. Additionally, trial
staff who participate in the administrative litigation process possess a wide
array of tools, from data requests and dispositions to inspections and
interrogatories, to collect relevant information and ensure that the evidentiary
record developed is adequate for decision making by the ALJ and the
Commission. In the UK context, utility regulators and the CMA also possess
wide evidence collection tools. OFCOM, for example, makes frequent use of
its statutory information-gathering powers when exercising its regulatory
functions.120 To take another example, the CMA has the power to require
the submission of additional information and clarification of the evidence
during energy licence modification appeals. It may also commission expert
evidence to help it interrogate evidence submitted by the appellant and by
117 See eg Sections 135 and 136 Communications Act 2003.
118 SW Yackee, ‘Sweet-Talking the Fourth Branch: The Influence of Interest Groups Comments on Federal
Agency Rulemaking’ (2006) 16 J Public Adm Res Theory 103.
119 APA, 5 USC § 556(d).
120 Section 145 of the Communications Act 2003.
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OFGEM. Parties are permitted to introduce new evidence insofar as the appeal
body considers it is relevant to the issue before it.
(iii) Lack of requisite institutional legitimacy
As compared to regulatory agencies, both generalist courts and specialist
tribunals lack the requisite institutional legitimacy to address cases involving
broad policy considerations. As already discussed, in many contexts, regulatory
agencies are required to trade off efficiency with equity considerations. This is
because utilities regulation has diverse legitimate aims that are not solely
guided by economic efficiency. For example, conditions for access to bottleneck
services for new entrants are mainly driven by efficiency considerations related
to the creation of a competitive marketplace. The provision of universal service,
however, seeks to create equality of outcome by supporting the service to a
legislatively defined category of users. This may involve the provision of a set of
services to end users at prices that depart from those resulting from normal
conditions. In such cases, a trade-off may arise in meeting the objective of
promoting competition, while at the same time ensuring universal access to a
set of services.
The regulatory agency may be said to enjoy superior institutional legitimacy
in resolving such trade-offs, deriving, in turn, from its political accountability.
This is because it is more informed on current political preferences than the
judiciary, which makes it ‘more likely to accurately reflect current enactable
preferences than judicial estimates about what political forces would enact’.121
The judiciary, on the other hand, is a ‘counter-majoritarian’122 institution
composed of unelected judges who should not use their power of review to act
contrary to the ‘majority will’ as expressed by representative institutions.
Hence, an increased judicial interference with policy choices jeopardises the
legitimacy of the institution. Especially in the UK context, institutional
legitimacy considerations are strongly pronounced, in light of the principle of
parliamentary sovereignty. Deference thus becomes relevant because there are
constitutional reasons for granting authority over the judiciary to the regulatory
agency.
The above-mentioned considerations should not, however, imply an abdi-
cation of the judicial role and function altogether. The judge will still have to
assess the economic methodologies and considerations employed to support
the agency’s policy decision as well as the factors relevant to the regulators’
determinations. The more expert the court or the tribunal in economics, the
121 E Elhauge, ‘Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules’ (2002) 18 Colum L Rev 2027, 2129.
122 A Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (Yale UP 1962); B Friedmam, ‘The Birth of an Academic
Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five’ (2002) 112 Yale LJ 153.
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greater the scrutiny that will be applied. The court, however, cannot
pronounce on the right policy to be pursued because the agency has the
legitimate authority to decide on this.
(iv) Courts’ susceptibility to ‘minoritarian bias’
Finally, contrary to what intuition would suggest, courts, and not solely
regulatory agencies, can be susceptible to ‘rent-seeking’ influences. While the
initial wave of public choice scholars addressed judges as operating outside the
world of special interests,123 the ‘new school of public choice theory’
increasingly brings the courts into the framework of public choice analysis.124
For example, Frank Cross argues that ‘[c]ourts are simply another venue in
which influence may be brought to bear upon government policy’.125 He
further discusses the variety of forms that the lobbying of courts can take,
including ‘text cases and forum shopping, amicus curiae participation, provision
of expert witnesses, selective settlement and other techniques’.126 Therefore,
on this basis, the Olsonian tenets of interest group theory can also be ratified in
the context of litigation, as narrow groups with greater economic stakes in
regulatory issues will be more willing to devote time and resources to hiring the
best lawyers and economic experts for their case, so as to be effectively
represented in expensive litigation over regulatory disputes.127 Ultimately, the
judge might end up being captured by special interests.
Most worryingly, courts’ susceptibility to ‘minoritarian bias’ might exacer-
bate the instances of tactical litigation. In other words, narrow groups may be
encouraged to bring unmeritorious appeals with a view to hampering or
obstructing the regulators’ functions. In the UK, OFCOM voiced concerns
about tactical litigation in the context of spectrum policy, with incumbent
mobile operators allegedly attempting to hold up the auction for the 800 MHz/
2.6 GHz spectrum by the threat of litigation.128
Strategic litigation may also be encouraged in the aftermath of the Infinis129
judgment in the UK, which, as already discussed, introduced a novel action for
damages for unlawful state actions in violation of the ECHR rights. Companies
may now be willing to use human rights claims to seek more favourable forms
of redress in judicial review proceedings.
123 W Landes and R Posner, ‘The Independent Judiciary in an Interest Group Perspective’ (1975) 18 JLE
875.
124 D Farber and AJ O’Connell, ‘Introduction: A Brief Trajectory of Public Choice and Public Law’ in D
Farber and A O’Connell (eds), Research Handbook in Public Law and Public Choice (Edward Elgar 2010) 4.
125 F Cross, ‘The Judiciary and Public Choice’ (1998) 50 Hastings LJ 355, 360.
126 ibid.
127 See M Olson, ‘Interest Group Litigation in Federal District Courts: Beyond the Political Disadvantage
Theory’ (1990) 52 J Pol 854, 859; D Songer and R Sheehan, ‘Who Wins on Appeal: Upperdogs and Underdogs
in the United States Courts Of Appeals’ (1992) 36 AJPS 235.
128 See E Richards (Chief Executive OFCOM), ‘Spectrum in an Age of Innovation—Speech for ECTA
Regulatory Conference 2011’ (2011) 4 <http://media.ofcom.org.uk/files/2011/12/SPECTRUM-POLICY-
SPEECH-291111.pdf> last accessed 17 September 2015.
129 See n 106.
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B. Some Implications of the Suggested Approach in Polycentric Disputes
The case of polycentric disputes epitomises the balance of institutional
competencies approach in determining the appropriate scope of review of
economic evidence. Such disputes do not solely involve the assessment of
complex economic appraisals, but also exacerbate the difficulty of distinguish-
ing who will be affected in the complex web of interdependent relationships.
Through negotiation and consultation, the regulator can acquire an informed
view of the heterogeneous interests. For instance, in the course of designing the
Revenue = Incentives + Innovation + Outputs (RRIO) price control mechan-
ism, OFGEM sought to enhance the engagement of heterogeneous interests,
such as consumer representatives, network users and companies. The authority
also set up a Consumer Challenge Group for the latest RRIO-ED1 price
control mechanism to act as a ‘critical friend’ to OFGEM to help ensure that
the price control settlement is in the best interests of existing and future
consumers.130 Moreover, the regulatory process may better ensure the
adequate representation of those groups that have traditionally been deemed
vulnerable to ‘majoritarian bias’, such as the disabled, the elderly and the
chronically sick. In fact, the UK utilities regulators have a specific objective to
promote the interests of such groups.131 The adjudicative process, however,
cannot take into account, to the same extent, the complex repercussions that
may result from the establishment of a price control mechanism, nor secure the
meaningful participation of all affected interests in court. Hence, it is the
polycentric dimension of such disputes rather than the difficulty of courts in
general to deal with price setting that may warrant the regulatory agency to
have greater flexibility to assess the weight of the relevant issues at stake.
The CAT seems to acknowledge the polycentric element of certain
regulatory disputes it is called upon to adjudicate. Prominent amongst these
are the so-called ‘termination rates disputes’132 arising under OFCOM’s
dispute resolution powers.133 In the T-Mobile v Ofcom134 case, involving a
number of disputes between British Telecom (BT) and mobile network
operators concerning the level of charges for wholesale mobile call termination,
the CAT stressed the necessity of a consultation process in enabling OFCOM
to assess the effects of its interventions on a number of affected interests other
than the parties to the disputes.135 Such interests may be the wholesale
customers of the parties to the dispute, who may be affected by the passing on
of a price increase for investment and innovation purposes; or they may be the
130 OFGEM Consumer Challenge Group <www.ofgem.gov.uk/network-regulation-%E2%80%93-riio-model/
riio-forums-seminars-and-working-groups/consumer-challenge-group> accessed 17 September 2015.
131 The Electronic Communications (Universal Service) (Amendment) Order 2011 (SI 2011/1209); Gas Act
1986, s 4AA(2); Electricity Act 1989, s 3A2.
132 T-Mobile (UK) Ltd v Office of Communications [2008] CAT 12.
133 Section 85 of the Communications Act 2003.
134 See above (n 132).
135 ibid para 188.
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consumers who would be adversely affected from the higher prices passed on to
BT’s customers; hence consumer representative bodies should be advised.
C. Factors Attenuating the Comparative Institutional Disadvantages of Courts
While institutional competence considerations are an influential factor in
determining the appropriate scope of review of economic evidence, they are not
decisive. The presence of a number of institutional realities may significantly
attenuate the comparative institutional disadvantages of courts and hence the
degree of deference accorded to the regulatory agency’s economic assessments.
This section will discuss a non-exhaustive list of such realities. Broadly, those
relate to: (i) the court’s specialisation in regulatory matters; and (ii) to the
court’s rules of procedure and its access to epistemic competence.
(i) The court’s specialisation in regulatory matters
In the presence of a specialised tribunal, like the UK CAT, the deference
accorded to the regulatory agency’s economic determinations may be lower
than where the assessment is made by a generalist court without any direct
access at epistemic competence. The CAT itself has acknowledged that its
familiarity with the statutory regime as well as ‘the relevant expertise in its
disposal may render the tribunal a more demanding and/or less deferential
tribunal than might otherwise be the case where a court is called upon to
review a decision of a specialist regulator’.136 One should also add that the
legislative provision of the appeal rights on the merits also encourages the
appellate institution to engage with economic arguments. In a number of cases,
judges have not hesitated to engage in a forensic review of complex regulatory
issues, to delve into the detail of the regulator’s reasoning and eventually
overturn his decision.137
Crucially, the institutional identity of the ‘expert tribunal’ has a direct impact
on judicial behaviour. This is clearly illustrated in the early cases, where the
CAT made a bold attempt to establish its image as a hyper-competent tribunal.
A meaningful way to do so was to disengage itself from the restrictive doctrines
governing judicial review of regulatory decisions developed by the High Court.
For instance, in the IBA Health case,138 the Court discarded the tautological
arbitration of the Wednesbury review of unreasonableness, requiring a decision
‘to be so unreasonable that no reasonable authority would have ever come to
it’139 in favour of the ‘ordinary’ and ‘natural’ meaning of the word.140 The
ordinary meaning of unreasonableness would enable a more wide-ranging
136 BSkyB v Competition Commission [2008] CAT 25, para 61.
137 See eg Vodafone Ltd v OFCOM [2008] CAT 22.
138 IBA Health Ltd v OFT [2003] CAT 27.
139 See above (n 14) 230.
140 See IBA Health Ltd (n 138) para 225.
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factual inquiry than that allowed under the restrictive Wednesbury test.
Furthermore, though acknowledging that the ordinary principles of judicial
review depend on the context in which they fall to be applied,141 it went on to
suggest that its constitution by Parliament as a specialist tribunal:
is in contrast to the more normal situation where a non-specialised court is called
upon to review the decision of a specialised decision-maker. For that reason we are
unpersuaded that there is necessarily a direct ‘readover’ to section 120 from cases
such as Cellcom, Interbrew, T-Mobile, and the Rail Regulator that have been cited to
us.142
The court’s specialisation in economic evidence, through its repeated
exposure to regulatory disputes, may also enhance its relative epistemic
competence vis-a`-vis the regulatory agencies. For example, in the US, the DC
Circuit’s members achieve a certain degree of specialisation through their
repeated exposure to regulatory cases. This kind of specialisation, which is
owing to rules of venue and geographical patterns in litigation, is better
captured in the notion of ‘subject matter’ specialisation. The mechanisms of
opinion specialisation and case assignment may also ameliorate the institutional
disadvantages of courts with respect to their lack of economic expertise. For
instance, in his important study on the ‘Myth of the Generalist Judge’, Edward
Cheng sheds empirical light on the de facto specialisation of the judge through
the process of opinion assignment in the federal courts of appeals.143 Finally,
judges’ prior educational background or training in economics or, possibly,
their prior experience in a regulatory agency of some kind may strengthen their
capacity to deal with economic evidence.
(ii) The court’s rules of procedure and its access to epistemic competence
The court’s rules of procedure may enhance the information record of the
courts concerning the dispute in question and allow for the better represen-
tation of affected interests. This, in turn, strengthens the institutional capacity
of the court to deal with polycentric disputes. For instance, the CAT’s
procedural rules favour an extensive—often forensic in nature—examination in
respect of each aspect of the regulators’ findings of fact and expert analysis.144
Prominent amongst these is the obligation on the part of the tribunal to ensure
case management through active intervention.145 Unlike the narrow scope of
the duty of case management of the High Court,146 there is wide scope for case
141 ibid 220.
142 ibid.
143 EK Cheng, ‘The Myth of the Generalist Judge’ (2008) 61 Stan L Rev 519.
144 See eg Everything Everywhere Ltd v CC [2012] CAT 11.
145 CAT Guide to Proceedings (n 50) 3.4(ii).
146 See CPR, rule 54 and the accompanying Practice Directions <www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/
civil/rules/part54/pd_part54a>.
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management under the CAT’s Rules of Procedure.147 Those rules, which are
partly based upon those of the EU General Court148 as well as on the Civil
Procedure Rules,149 crucially reserve to the CAT a central role in controlling
the process, which is not inquisitorial but adversarial. In the course of the case
management conference, which consists of a pre-hearing review serving a
variety of functions (eg evidence gathering and fact finding), the tribunal may
order the disclosure of documents or require the parties to particularise their
pleadings.150 There also exists an enforcement mechanism in the form of
penalties for non-compliance with the court orders.151
Crucially, the CAT may consider new evidence, which was not submitted to
the regulator before it made the decision which is being appealed,152 or
evidence that informed the regulator’s decision during the administrative phase
but that was made available to the parties either in the regulator’s final decision
or during the appeal process.153 The CAT is also entitled to require the
provision of evidence that was not before the regulator if it considers that the
party who wishes to adduce it has shown good reason to justify it and that it is
in the interests of justice to admit it.154 For instance, the tribunal may consider
an econometric study that had not yet been conducted when the regulator was
forming his decision. Vodafone v OFCOM155 is a case in point. On the basis of
the witness statement submitted on behalf of the intervener H3G, the CAT
decided that OFCOM’s decision to mandate direct routing of calls to ported
numbers was not robust and should be overturned.
The CAT considers its ability to consider new evidence as conferring ‘a
broad discretion to the tribunal regarding the admission or exclusion of
evidence which discretion is coloured by the nature of the appeal that is being
heard’.156 The circumstances under which the CAT should admit fresh
evidence were elucidated in principle by the Court of Appeal in BT v
OFCOM.157 It was made clear that no party should enjoy an unfettered right
to adduce fresh evidence on appeal and that parties should present their cases
147 The Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2003 (Statutory Instrument 2003/1372); The Competition
Appeal Tribunal (Amendment and Communications Act Appeals) Rules (Statutory Instrument 2004/2068).
148 See Consolidated Version of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court [2010] C177/02, esp arts 64–65.
See further Consolidated Version of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice [2010] C177/01.
149 Civil Procedure Rules (SI 1998/2123). See also A Zuckerman, Civil Procedure (2nd edn, Thomson 2006)
17. See further CAT Guide to Proceedings (n 50) para 3.
150 CAT Rules 2003 (n 147), art 19.
151 ibid art 24.
152 ibid art 22.
153 See eg Imperial Tobacco and others v OFT [2011] CAT 41.
154 ibid. Note, however, that there is a presumption against permitting the regulator under appeal to submit
new evidence: see Napp Pharmaceutical Holdings Ltd and Subsidiaries v DGFT [2001] CAT 3, para 77.
155 Vodafone Ltd v OFCOM [2008] CAT 22.
156 BT (British Telecommunications plc (Termination Charges: 080 calls) v OFCOM [2010] CAT 17, para 83.
157 See BT v OFCOM [2011] EWCA Civ 245.
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during the administrative phase as fully as the circumstances permit. In sharp
contrast, there is limited scope for evidence in judicial review proceedings,
which was not before the original decision maker.158 A High Court judge will
typically refuse to allow a decision maker to adduce evidence to justify its
original decision or to allow a party to challenge a decision on the basis of
material that was not available to the decision maker when the original decision
was made. In such cases, the High Court will normally remit the decision for
reconsideration by the original decision maker on the basis of the new
evidence. The rationale for that restrictive approach is that the reviewing court
should normally be directing its attention to the material available to the body
whose decision is being reviewed rather than deciding the merits of the case de
novo.159
Finally, although the CAT is first and foremost an appellate tribunal and not
the primary fact finder,160 the information record is enhanced through its
discretion to permit oral cross-examination of witnesses, especially when the
primary facts are in dispute.161 In fact, the tribunal has gone as far as to argue
that a merits appeal ‘provides . . . a right to call and cross examine wit-
ness[es]’.162 Although the CAT disfavours ‘prolonged cross-examination
sessions that last for days and days and days’,163 in a number of regulatory
disputes it has ordered the cross-examination of witnesses. In the PPC case,164
for instance, which involved a challenge against OFCOM’s determination to
resolve disputes between BT and other communications providers regarding
BT charges for partial private circuits (PPCs), four witnesses were cross-
examined on the economic assessments underlying BT’s cost-orientation
obligation. To take another example, in the 08-numbers case,165 involving two
appellants (BT plc and Everything Everywhere Ltd), OFCOM as a defendant
and five interveners, 49 witness statements and expert reports were adduced in
158 The limited circumstances in which fresh evidence may be admitted were laid down by the Court of
Appeal in R v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex parte Powis [1981] 1 WLR 584, 595. See, however, R
(Lynch) v General Dental Council [2003] EWHC 2987 (Admin) [2004] 1 All ER 1159, where Collins J allowed
fresh evidence that was outside of the Powis principles against the backdrop of a technically complex area (‘its
purpose is in reality to explain to the Court matters which it needs to understand in order to reach a just
conclusion’, para 25). See further Part 35 of the Civil Procedure Rules and A Lidbetter, ‘Expert Evidence in
Judicial Review’ (2004) 9 JR 194.
159 This was the reason behind the Court’s refusal to admit fresh expert evidence in relation to the provision
of public sewers in Dwr Cymru Cyfyngedig v Environment Agency of Wales [2003] EWHC 336 (Admin).
160 In proceedings under the Competition Act 1998 Act the CAT acts both as an appellate review court and
also as a court of first instance exercising the role of the primary decision maker. See further JJ Burgess & Sons v
OFT [2005] CAT 25, where the CAT adopted its own decision, on the merits of the case, in which it disagreed
with the OFT’s analysis and substituted its finding of an abuse for that of the OFT.
161 See CAT Guide to Proceedings (n 50) s 3.4; PPC case (n 21) para 139; BT (Termination Charges: 080
calls) v OFCOM [2011] CAT 24, para 84.
162 VIP Communications Ltd v OFCOM [2007] CAT 3, para 43.
163 Argos Ltd & Littlewoods Ltd v OFT [2003] CAT 10.
164 Above n 21.
165 See BT and Others v OFCOM [2012] EWCA Civ 1002.
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evidence, 13 witnesses of fact provided evidence and seven economic experts
were cross-examined on the 24 reports analysing the impact of BT’s proposed
price charges. OFCOM has, indeed, praised cross-examination as a powerful
mechanism in ‘exposing witnesses whose evidence is not empirically supported,
contradictory or misleading’.166 In contrast, the High Court rarely hears
witnesses or expert witnesses, and it has never sat with an assessor in a judicial
review case.
The evidentiary constraints of judicial review before the High Court are
highlighted in the BT v Secretary of Business, Innovation & Skills case,167
involving BT’s challenge, by way of judicial review, to the implementation of
the Digital Economy Act 2010. The following extract from the judgment of
Kenneth Parker J recognises that although economic evidence was adduced,
the constraints of judicial review and of the High Court’s case management
rules meant that it was not possible to scrutinise the volume of the material
submitted to the court:
In a case of this nature, there are real limits on the process of adjudication. Although
I was confronted with 11 files of evidence, I cannot be entirely confident that all
relevant material was before me, nor can the sheer constraints of judicial review
proceedings afford the time that would be necessary critically and rigorously to
evaluate the volume of material that was submitted. For example, a number of expert
economists were deployed on each side, putting forward with equal conviction and
rigour their rival cases. Experience in the Restrictive Practices Court, now extinct,
suggests that a thorough exploration and assessment of such evidence could be likely
to take many days of detailed cross-examination.168
In sum, the balance of comparative institutional competencies approach
invites a case-by-case assessment of the differences in competence characteris-
ing the decision-making process involved in the dispute in question. In doing
so, this approach rejects those normative prescriptions on deference that are
informed by single-factor explanations (ie the judge does not possess expertise
in economics) in favour of a richer set of factors that may determine the degree
of deference owed to the regulators’ economic assessments. It therefore
furnishes a more pragmatic response to the challenges posed by economic
evidence in regulatory disputes that is attentive to institutional realities and
determinants of judicial behaviour.
166 See P Weitzman (General Counsel OFCOM) and G Myers (Director of Competition Economics OFOM),
‘Experiences with the CAT’, presentation given at King’s Centre for European Law, Tuesday 18 October 2011
<www.kcl.ac.uk/depsta/law/news/news_details.php?id=544> last accessed 17 September 2015.
167 R, on the application of British Telecommunications Plc and another v Secretary of State for Business, Innovation
& Skills and Others (Open Rights Group and another, intervening) [2011] EWHC 1021.
168 ibid paras 213–15.
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6. Concluding Remarks: Towards a Complementary Relationship
between the Court and the Agency in the Realm of Utilities
Regulation?
This article has highlighted that the substantive review of economic evidence
enshrined in the regulatory agency’s discretion should become sensitive to
institutional competencies considerations if the challenges posed by economic
evidence are to be effectively met. The pluralistic nature of the regulatory and
adjudicative process—where various imperfect alternative decision makers
interact—coupled with the polycentric element of regulatory disputes, brings to
the forefront factors such as fact-finding competence and evidence-gathering
tools that should also inform the scope of review. Through the lens of
comparative institutional analysis, the regulatory and adjudicative process
emerge as interdependent complements, as they may both be both equally
defective in some aspects, in ensuring the soundness of regulatory decisions.
Hence, deference emerges as an institutional choice of the least imperfect
alternative; an essentially competence-assessment exercise. Drawing on insights
from political science and economics, the suggested approach illuminates the
institutional disadvantages of the courts that may warrant a high degree of
deference. At the same time, however, it remains sensitive to a number of
institutional realities and procedural developments that may attenuate the
weight of such comparative institutional disadvantages.
Interestingly, there seem to be a few instances where US and UK courts have
assessed their relative institutional competence vis-a`-vis the regulators. In the
US, courts have started taking into account their institutional limitations,169
although, as Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule argue, this recognition
remains ‘episodic and occasional’.170 In the UK, in the adjudication of
regulatory disputes that involve polycentric elements (eg the imposition of
regulatory remedies), the CAT nearly always affords a considerable degree of
deference to the regulators, despite its epistemic competence and the wide
possibility for third party interventions that allow the representation of a
greater number of interests. For instance, in the Albion case,171 when the
tribunal was asked to specify a minimum retail margin, it refrained from doing
so by engaging in an implicit comparative institutional analysis of the relative
169 See eg Pacific Bell Telephone Company, dba AT&T California, et al v linkLine Communications, Inc, et al, 555
US 438, 129 S Ct 1109 (2009) (linkLine). The Supreme Court ruled that ‘[i]nstitutional concerns’ counsel
against adopting a stand-alone price squeeze theory, at linkLine, 1120–1. The Court emphasised in particular the
difficulty that exists in administering a rule that would require judges ‘to police’ both retail and wholesale prices
and ensure that the ‘interaction’ between them does not ‘squeeze’ rival firms, and the elusiveness in trying to
apply a requirement that a monopolist leave its rivals a ‘fair’ or ‘adequate’ margin: linkLine, 1120–1.
170 See C Sunstein and A Vermeule, ‘Institutions and Interpretation’ (2003) 101 Mich L Rev 885, 887.
171 Albion Water Limited v Water Services Regulation Authority [2006] CAT 23, para 31.
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merits of the adjudicative and regulatory process, when presented with
polycentric disputes:
How can the Tribunal [or a competition authority] determine this margin without
examining costs and demands, indeed without acting as a price-setting regulator, the
determinations of which often last for several years (and are themselves subject to
appeals)? . . . [H]ow [should] the Tribunal, or the Authority . . . respond when costs or
demands change over time, as inevitably they will. The efficient margin fixed today
may, through economic and business changes, become the inefficient margin of
tomorrow. We do not say that these questions are unanswerable, but we have said
enough to show why courts normally avoid direct price administration, relying on
more appropriate methods.172
Finally, the conclusions reached in this article may prove to be especially
relevant to those countries designing or reforming appeal mechanisms in the
utilities sector, such as the UK. In June 2013, the Department for Business,
Innovation and Skills launched an important consultation on ‘Streamlining
Regulatory and Competition Appeals’173 whose outcome is still pending. The
proposals range widely and, if implemented, could hugely affect the appeal
mechanisms for utility regulators in the UK. Amongst the most controversial
ones, are those related to changing the standard of review for communications
appeals from a merits review to a judicial review standard or defined grounds
of appeal.174 Comparative institutional analysis could inform the choice of the
appropriate standard and intensity of review by requiring that any determin-
ation of the standard of review should follow and not precede that of
institutional choice. Institutional choice should be comparative and include an
assessment of the comparative institutional competence of all institutions
engaging in the review of regulatory decisions, as discussed in this article.
172 ibid para 55.
173 See above (n 3).
174 ibid ch 4.
30 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies
 at U
niversity of Reading on January 8, 2016
http://ojls.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
